Exploring Classical Theism and Physicalism :: Religion

Exploring Classical Theism and PhysicalismABSTRACT Could a classical theisticalical be a sensibleist? Although a negative answer to this question may seem obvious, it turns give away that a case can be do for the consistency of a variant of classical theism and global supervenience physicalism. Although intriguing, the case in the long run fails due to the weakness of global supervenience as an account of the dependence of moral on physical properties.Physicalism is popular these days, and to a lesser consequence so is classical theism. It should therefore come as no storm that a number of theists are bent on combining theism with physicalism. notwithstanding could a classical theist be a physicalist? Is this a reproducible doctrinal combination? The classical theist affirms the metaphysically necessary cosmos of a concrete, purely spiritual, creation upon which every other concrete being is ontologically dependent. The physicalist, however, is committed to the proposit ion that everything, or at least everything concrete, is every physical or determined by the physical. To be a bit more(prenominal) precise, physicalism is usefully viewed as the conjunction of an inventory dissertation which specifies physicalistically permissible individuals and a determination thesis which specifies physicalistically admissible properties.(1) What the inventory thesis says, at a first approximation, is that every concretum is either a physical item or composed of physical items. As for the determination thesis, what it says is that physical property-instantiations determine all other property-instantiations equivalently, every nonmaterial property-instantiation supervenes on physical property-instantiations. These rough characterizations suggest that theism and physicalism logically expel one another. If God as classically conceived exists, then the inventory thesis is violated not every concrete entity is either physical or composed of physical items. And i f God exists, it would also appear that the determination thesis is flouted Gods instantiation of his omni-attributes does not supervene on His instantiation of any physical properties He has none. So at first glance it seems almost crashingly obvious that the classical theist cannot be a physicalist.But this talk cannot end just yet. For when we overhear down to the details of formulating precise versions of both the inventory and determination theses, it turns out that there is a way to attempt the reconciliation of theism and physicalism. It is the viability of this way that I aim to explore. But first some background.Towards Nonreductive PhysicalismI provide take it for granted that a plausible version of physicalism cannot be either eliminativist or reductionist.